JOURNAL OF DIALECTICS OF NATURE
A Comprehensive, Academic Journal of the Philosophy, History, Sociology and Cultural Studies of Science and Technology
Author Information
WANG Huaping
Information
<p>Department of Philosophy</p><p>Shandong University</p><p>waguter@gmail.com</p>
Research Articles
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Cognitive Penetration and New Dogmatism Abstract: Cognitive penetration is the phenomenon that cognition sometimes exerts top-down effects on perception. It seems that cognitive penetration poses a threat to perceptual justification. Taking dogmatism as a paradigm, Susanna Siegel has argued that the threat cognitive penetration posed to perceptual justification is intractable. This paper shows that the reason why dogmatism is taken to be unable to give an adequate account of cognitive penetration is that it was thought to be epistemological phenomenalism. But if we reject epistemological phenomenalism and come to endorse a new version, that is, new dogmatism, then the threat pose by cognitive penetration dissolves. The conclusion, hence, is that cognitive penetration is not a threat to new dogmatism. On the contrary, it shows that new dogmatism is adequate.Issue:Volume 40, lssue 8, August 2018Page: 21-27
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Mind Uploading from the Perspective of Mortal Computation Abstract: With the rapid advancement of neuroscience and artificial intelligence, mind uploading is shifting from a mere speculative notion to an issue that demands serious philosophical attention. Optimists generally believe that the continuation of the “self” can be achieved by successfully replicating the brain’s functional organization. However, this belief rests on an unexamined assumption: that the uploaded system possesses consciousness. Drawing on the theoretical framework of mortal computation, this paper argues that the realization of consciousness depends on dissipative processes within specific physical systems. Its mode of existence is deeply embedded in the concrete conditions of implementation and cannot be reconstructed or sustained through abstract replication or structural transfer. Hence, mind uploading faces a fundamental paradox: if the upload lacks consciousness, its continuation is meaningless; if it possesses consciousness, that consciousness belongs to “it”, no longer to “me”. This paradox reveals a deeper truth: the mortality of consciousness is not a limitation, but the very foundation of its existence. Key Words: Mind uploading; Personal identity; Neuron replacement; Mortal computationIssue:Volume 48, lssue 5, May 2026Page: 50-58
JOURNAL OF DIALECTICS OF NATURE
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