Abstract

Cognitive penetration is the phenomenon that cognition sometimes exerts top-down effects on perception. It seems that cognitive penetration poses a threat to perceptual justification. Taking dogmatism as a paradigm, Susanna Siegel has argued that the threat cognitive penetration posed to perceptual justification is intractable. This paper shows that the reason why dogmatism is taken to be unable to give an adequate account of cognitive penetration is that it was thought to be epistemological phenomenalism. But if we reject epistemological phenomenalism and come to endorse a new version, that is, new dogmatism, then the threat pose by cognitive penetration dissolves. The conclusion, hence, is that cognitive penetration is not a threat to new dogmatism. On the contrary, it shows that new dogmatism is adequate.

Key Words

Perceptual justification; Cognitive penetration; New dogmatism; Perceptual experience

Citation: Wang, H. 'Cognitive Penetration and New Dogmatism' [J]. Journal of Dialectics of Nature, 2018, 40(8): 21-27.

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