Abstract: With the rapid advancement of neuroscience and artificial intelligence, mind uploading is shifting from a mere speculative notion to an issue that demands serious philosophical attention. Optimists generally believe that the continuation of the “self” can be achieved by successfully replicating the brain’s functional organization. However, this belief rests on an unexamined assumption: that the uploaded system possesses consciousness. Drawing on the theoretical framework of mortal computation, this paper argues that the realization of consciousness depends on dissipative processes within specific physical systems. Its mode of existence is deeply embedded in the concrete conditions of implementation and cannot be reconstructed or sustained through abstract replication or structural transfer. Hence, mind uploading faces a fundamental paradox: if the upload lacks consciousness, its continuation is meaningless; if it possesses consciousness, that consciousness belongs to “it”, no longer to “me”. This paradox reveals a deeper truth: the mortality of consciousness is not a limitation, but the very foundation of its existence.

Key Words: Mind uploading; Personal identity; Neuron replacement; Mortal computation