Abstract: Since Miranda Fricker put forward the concept of epistemic injustice, the discussion upon it has attracted the attention of many scholars from various fields. They place especial emphasis on testimonial injustice, which is a typical kind of epistemic injustice. According to Fricker, the central cases of it could be defined as “identity-prejudicial credibility deficit”; the primary harm of it lies in the deprivation of the speaker’s cognitive ability, which in nature is a kind of “epistemic objectification”. In recent years, some scholars have questioned the “objectification” reading, saying that it pays too much attention on the agential aspect and ignores its structural aspect. In order to overcome the limitations of it, they put forward the “othering” reading. According to the latter, the nature of testimonial injustice is the epistemic exclusion of some groups or individuals. Systemically considering this dispute will not only help us understand the testimonial injustice more comprehensively, but also provide us with some useful enlightenment.
Key Words: Testimonial injustice; Epistemic objectification; Epistemic othering; Epistemic injustice