Abstract

The explanatory gap in cognitive science drives people to naturalize phenomenology in order to make cognitive science capture the part it previously could not. The explanatory gap is produced by ontological, epistemological and methodological differences between mind and physical phenomena. The content of phenomenology overlaps in quite a high degree with the part that cognitive science was incapable of. However, phenomenology is essentially anti-naturalist because of its epistemological concern and unique methodology. Thus, it needs to naturalize phenomenology to make up cognitive science. However, current approaches of naturalizing phenomenology either have changed the very essence of phenomenology or have changed nothing. Hence, cognitive science needs not to naturalize phenomenology. Nevertheless, phenomenology can still contribute to cognitive science.

Key Words

Cognitive science; Phenomenal experience; Explanatory gap; Naturalization; Phenomenology

Citation: Zhou, L. 'Does Cognitive Science Need to Naturalize Phenomenology?' [J]. Journal of Dialectics of Nature, 2018, 40(12): 20-27.

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