
Abstract: According to a prominent view in contemporary philosophy of physics, the instantaneous velocity of a moving object is nothing but the time derivative of its spacetime trajectory. In other words, instantaneous velocity is metaphysically fully determined by its spacetime trajectory. This reductionist stance on instantaneous velocity is arguably the classic, textbook understanding of the concept. Nevertheless, it faces two powerful philosophical challenges: first, it conflicts with the explanatory role that instantaneous velocity is supposed to play; second, it confronts a metaphysical arbitrariness problem with regards to grounding. Drawing upon the distinction between substantivalism and relationism about spacetime, this paper argues that the metaphysical inquiry into instantaneous velocity (and the nature of motion) depends on one’s view on the ontology of spacetime. As long as we abandon the substantivalist understanding of spacetime and adopt a relationalist one instead, we can offer effective responses to the two difficulties mentioned above.
Key Words: Instantaneous velocity; Rates of change; Spacetime substantivalism; Spacetime relationalism; The nature of motion
