Abstract: Contemporary philosophy of memory centres on the nature of episodic memory, which refers to the memory of events that occurred at a particular time and place. The standard view sees the mental image of the remembered event as an essential component of episodic memory. For example, Fernández explicitly argues that the metaphysical essence of episodic memory is a kind of mental image. However, in the past decade, psychologists have coined the notion of “aphantasia”, a condition in which individuals struggle to generate mental imagery. Empirical studies have shown that while aphantasics have difficulties visualizing mental images, they can nevertheless complete episodic memory tasks. Specifically, despite the reduced vividness of their retrieved content, aphantasics are not inferior to non-aphantasics in terms of the accuracy and success rate of episodic memory. This indicates that mental images may not be a necessary condition for episodic memory, and thus the standard view has overlooked the diversity of mechanisms underlying episodic memory. In light of this, the present paper will propose and outline a more inclusive functionalist theory of episodic memory.

Key Words: Episodic memory; Aphantasia; Mental imagery; Functionalism