Abstract: One of the assumptions often included in many ethical and legal discussions about human

enhancement is that enhancement is a concept that can be distinguished from treatment and this concept presents

unique ethical and legal challenges. However, some other scholars believe that whether the dichotomy between

enhancement and treatment can be established needs reflection. They not only question whether this distinction is

feasible from the fuzziness and relativity of the standard, but also question the rationality of this distinction based

on the continuum of the practical reasons for pursuing treatment and enhancement. With the help of the conceptual

tools and theoretical methods of law philosophy, we examined the various doubts raised about the dichotomy of

enhancement and treatment one by one and found that: on the one hand, the Normal Function Model provides a

feasible criterion for distinction of treatment and enhancement; and on the other hand, the application of Rawls’

principle of “fair equality of opportunity” in the field of public health also suggests that this dichotomy is of moral

and legal importance.

Key Words: Treatment; Human enhancement; Continuum; Fair equality of opportunity

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https://jdn.ucas.ac.cn/public/uploads/files/67862483cc552.pdf